International meetings and BSE
International meetings and the presentations given that
concern BSE
Clearly there are a lot of meetings, and more are appearing
concerning the subject. The main reason seems to be that many
more people want to have them and many more to come. This list
contains only a few of the major european meetings on TSE but
it is clear that, at the beginning little was released
concerning BSE. Click on the name of the list to move to that.
- The meeting at the Royal Institute of British Architects in
London in 1991 was the first to make it clear that little work
was being done on BSE that was ready for presentation. Even
though this was 4 years after the disease had begone, there was
one speech on the epidemiology so far of BSE and another from
Ray Bradley telling us that everything was all right and not to
worry. The hall was full with people from all over the world.
- The meeting at Royal Society in 1993 was similarly packed
but similarly there was little information about BSE. Again the
hall was full.
- The meeting at the National Food Alliance
in 1995 seems to have been the first at which the 'dont worry
about it' group from the MAFF actually gave lectures to the 'do
something about it' groups from around the country. A small
lecture theatre was full and contained media people waiting to
interview the experts.
- The meeting at Goettingen in 1995
contained various pieces of information that were clearly of use
to research into BSE. This was the biggest yet and clearly more
groups were becoming involved in the subject.
- The 1996 meeting of the Society for Risk
Analysis contained lectures concerning the assessment of the
risk associated with various foods and how the population view
these risks (if they knew).
- The May 1996 meeting at Rochdale
This is on a separate web page and is an important meeting with
full documentation.
- Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Decision-Making in Times of Uncertainty,
June 5-6, 1996, Crowne Plaza, Toronto. This has a number of
speakers indicating how little we know about the risk associated
with blood transfusion.
- BSE and Public Health, (July 1996) the major meeting
organised by the Public Health Association, was published.
Copies are available from Dr. Karen Toque, North West Public
Health Authority, Fazakerley Hospital, Lower Lane, Liverpool L9
7AL UK 0151 525 2323.
- Prions and Brain diseases in Animals and Humans. Nato
Advanced Workshop. Erice, Sicily 19th to 22nd August 1996. This
was actually organised through NATO and, although it was offered
to put this on the Internet, it appears that copies of the
documents will be released at a later date and will probably be
available from Dr. John Collinge, St. Mary's Hospital, London
W2.
- Les Encephalopathies Subaigues Spongiformes Transmissibles:
etat actuel des connaissances. This was issued in November 1996
following the meeting in Bougival: 'Programme de Recherche sur
les esst et les prions' "Methodes Diagnostiques et outils
biologiques' I presume that copies can be got from Madame
Jaqueline Dubot, InSERM, Service ICAR, 101 rue de Tolbiac-75654,
Paris, Cedex 13. Paris - 44.23.61.40.
- The Royal Statistical Society Meeting on
26th November 1996
No specifically new information was released but rather the
various groups involved in the subject were actually in one room
explaining their position. This seems to have been the first
time that this took place during the epidemic and was, dispite
the anger that it produced with some people, was a breath of
fresh air
- Ray Bradley simply gave a very-practiced lecture
about how BSE was simply going away and there was no risk
anyway. There was no infectivity in the tissues we ate, and all
the cattle with clinical disease were being slaughtered. How
could there be a problem?
- John Wilesmith similarly told everyone how the
disease had reached its peak and was dropping in incidence.
- Chris Bostock explained some of the genetics of
disease.
- Harash Narang stated that his research had been
tampered with, that attempts had been made to avoid testing
cattle for disease, and that various tissues, not banned were
still present in human food.
- Steve Dealler stated that, using MAFF data you could
easily show that quite large numbers of BSE (clinically
symptomatic) infected cattle were not being either reported or
reaching MAFF statistics. He claimed that the numbers of
infected cattle being eaten were unacceptably high, that the
risk to humans could not be certainly stated, as Bradley had
done, as being low, and, as such we should assume it to be a
risk and get on with the research.
- Oskar Kaaden stated that many of the cattle showing
signs of BSE had not received any infected food at all, and that
the epidemiology was simply not acceptable as presented by
Wilesmith. He was worried that infected cattle were reaching
the German population and that Bradley's statements, being
scientifically invalid, should not be presumed to be true by
Government just because they would like them to be true.
- Professor Almond, who was chairman, gave an short
review of the talks...and basically repeated what Dealler had
claimed; That there was inadequate information at this time to
be certain of BSE safety to humans
- Colin McLean (Once, junior minister for Agriculture
in 1990, but now working for the Meat and Livestock Commission)
Claimed that dispite all the scientists that seemed to know
little about that actual goings on in the meat trade, British
beef was doing well and getting better. He said little about BSE.
- Tim Lang (now from the Centre for Food Policy). Went
through the information as it had appeared during the epidemic
and it became clear that MAFF released the information that they
wanted the people to hear. This seemes to have been true with
other food 'scares' that have taken place in the UK.
- Carman Taboas (from the National Consumer Council)
explained how they had been simply told all about BSE by MAFF
and had believed what they were told. Various people in the
audience were furious that this had happened. Afterall, the NCC
was supposed to be on the side of the consumer not the side of
the MAFF. Meldrum (Chief veterinary officer in the UK) was
furious at this, stood up and stated that they had done their
best.
- Derek Cooper (the well-known journalist) was the
chairman and reviewed the afternoon as indicating that the
information just did not seem to reach the populus and basically
this may have been because there was no way for the journalists
to work out who was telling them the truth. After all, if MAFF
say everything is OK, and Lacey says that a plague is taking
place, it is almost impossible for someone outside the subject
to work out.
- The meeting was remarkably useful, with groups from the pet
food industry, from environmental health, from the meat trade,
from public health, from the Department of Health, and from
other directions. All came away feeling that at least the
groups had got together. Until then MAFF seems to have
monopolised the media despite having given information that was
known to be misleading.
Prion meeting at Goettingen, November
1995
This was a 2 day meeting with the experts from all over the
world presenting the latest information. It was successful but
too large to explain entirely here. Information about the
conference can be obtained from Professor Hans Kretzschmar,
Institut fur Neuropathologie University of Goettingen, Robert
Koch Strasse 40, 37085 Goettingen, Germany. The only
presentations shown here are those felt to be of special
significance to BSE in the UK.
- Epidemiology of BSE. John Wilesmith. He gave a
short explanation of the epidemiology that had taken place and
showed graphs indicating that the feed ban in 1988 had been
associated with a sudden drop in the number of cattle becoming
infected. He explained that they simply were not sure just how
the disease continued after that time and went through the
explanations. Little was said about vertical transmission. It
was felt that pig meal, which continued to be made partly from
dead cattle, may have been fed to cattle and showed a (rather
poor) relationship between the presence of pig feeding and the
continuation of BSE cases after the ban. By rights, however,
MAFF had been explaining that almost no infected cattle were
being slaughtered in an abattoir (from where the pig meal tissue
is taken). Wilesmith's research would suggest that infected
cattle were being eaten by humans. He did not mention this. No
mention was made of under-reporting of cases. It is clear,
however, that large amounts of research had gone into his
epidemiology and the audience was impressed.
- Epidemiology of CJD in UK. Rob Will. He explained
that CJD has increased in the UK but the evidence that this is
significant is poor. The prevalence in the UK seems to be about
the same as in other countries of the EC and it may just be that
we are reporting cases whereas previously the clinicians were
not carrying out post-mortems. He claimed that no risk factors
included an occupation. He said that the 3 farmers (of BSE
infected herds) that had died of CJD recently could not yet be
said to be significant, and specific foodstuffs eaten by CJD
patients did not seem to be signficant, the data being fragile
because the numbers are so small.He announced that a second
teenager (only the fourth in the world) in the UK with CJD had
died. This was international news. No mention was made of the
4th farmer or of the other 2 teenagers that were currently
comatose. It was not clear how he managed to maintain the farmer
statistics as not being significant. He said that other
occupations (e.g. vicars) currently seemed to have too many
cases but did not point out that this sort of result is expected
with any study of this kind and, out of hundreds of occupations,
to find that farmers with BSE herds were one of the small numers
significantly more likely to die of CJD was going to be a
problem with the press in the UK.
- The risk of blood-borne CJD: pros and cons. Paul
Brown. He explained that, at the moment there was no evidence
that CJD infected patients passed the disease to another person
in a blood transfusion. He said that blood certainly contained
infection but the statistics were so small with the 4 studies
that had taken place until that time that no actual cases could
be demonstrated in a recipient. At the end Dr. Dealler said
that humans in the UK may be infected with BSE and asked if Dr.
Brown felt that UK blood products should not be exported. He
said that there was no risk to anyone from BSE and that UK blood
was not a risk. He was also asked if he would take a blood
transfusion from someone with CJD and he said he wouldn't.
- Comparison of physicochemical propeties of two strains of
transmissible mink encephalopathy. Richard Marsh. The
reason that this was so important was that you could actually
tell the difference between two strains, known as the drowsy and
hyper types, by exposing the agents to various chemicals or
separation procedures. This was the first that this had been
demonstrated. See Byron Caughey's article.
- Agent strian variation in scrapie and BSE. Moira
Bruce. Hard work had been put into looking at the distribution
of damage done to the brain of a mouse by various strains of
TSE. One thing was found was that the damage distribution
remained the same, even if the strain was derived from various
species. For instance, if BSE was injected into a cat, and then
the agent from the original cow and from the cat put into
separate mice, what you find is that the distribtion of damage
is the same from both sources. What was also found was that BSE
distribution seemed to be totally separate from that produced by
scrapie. They had known this for some time and had advised MAFF
that they could not claim that BSE came from scrapie as a result
as the evidence was against this. What is now to be done is to
inoculate the disease from the humans (the farmers) into mice
and see if it is the same as BSE.
- Transgenic investigations of prion diseases. Stan
Prusiner. He put forward the resutls of some previous
experiments showing that the prion gene, if carrying an
alteration was associated with the animal developing a TSE
apparently spontaneously. He showed that the insertion into a
mouse chromosome of the gene from another animal would make the
recipient then senstive to the TSE of that animal. Well, that
was true with the hamster gene but when they tried with a human
one things were much more difficult. Eventually, they found
that by adding part of the gene the problem was solved.
Prusiner claimed that he could look for a human TSE infection
with a mouse and not suffer the problem of the 'species barrier'
preventing the mouse becoming infected. This is very important
in that it could be used to see if humans are already infected
with BSE.
- Human molecular genetics and transgenic models of human
prion disease. John Collinge. He went though the
association between genetics and CJD, then the neurological
changes seen in mice without the PrP gene, then explained that
mice carrying the human gene (even many copies of it), when
inoculated with BSE, did become infected, but produced the mouse
prion not the human one. Nobody seemed to know how to interpret
this. Clearly it would have been nice to be able to say that,
as mice appear to be difficult to infect with BSE, this may show
that humans are even more difficult to infect than mice.
However, Prusiners speech suggested that this could not be taken
as an interpretation, and we would have to wait until the mice
carrying the human PrP and not the mouse one were inoculated
with BSE in order to find a good indication if humans can be
infected with BSE.
- In vitro models of protease-resistant PrP formation,
scrapie strains and species barriers. Byron Caughey. The
most amazing thing here was that the two strains of TME (see
above) could be produced by the presence of the relevant prion
proteins in vitro. i.e. if the drowsy prion was put into a test
tube with some chromosomal (normal) prion protein it was the
drowsy form that was produced using the method published in
Nature. The problem with prions up until now had always been
that nobody could see how the prion could have a strain type.
What seems to have been shown is that the prions can indeed have
one, and can indeed produce further prions of the same strain.
- Fatal spongiform encephalopathy in a patient who ingested
animal feed. Weis J, Schroder JM, Podoll K and Schwarz M.
Inst of Neuropathology and Neurological clinic, Technical
University (RWTH) Aachen, Germany. Apparently a patient who died
of CJD was known to have tasted various feeds meant for animals
over several years. No BSE was known to have been in the food.
- Risk factors for CJD: a reanalysis of case control
studies. Many groups were authors including Wientjens, D
from Erasmus University Medical School, Rotterdam, and
Davanipour Z from University of Southern California, Los
Angeles. Few associations were found between specific
conditions and the development of CJD. Specifically, having
other members of the family with CJD (or even perhaps other
psychotic or dementing illness) was associated. Although not
significantly increased (which would have been very difficult
because of the small numbers of cases in the study) an elevated
risk was found for subjects that were employed as health
professionals and subjects ever exposed to cows and sheep.
- Vertical transmission of BSE: epidemiological evidence.
Dealler S, Burnley General Hospital, UK. He made it clear
that various statistics in the epidemiology of BSE did not fit
with the epidemiology that was expected for a disease that was
passed purely through feed. What fitted much better was the
model that it was the mothers that ate the infective material
and they infected their offspring. The appearence of cattle in
Portugal with BSE that were the offspring of exported UK cattle,
the slow decay in the cases of BSE after the feed ban, the
increased likelyhood of a herd that has had a case of BSE to
have another compared with unaffected herd, the steady in-herd
rate at approximately 25% (why not 100%?), and the apparent 2
peaks in the age distribution of cattle developing BSE. A lot
of ifs and buts were needed to fit the MAFF model to the
epidemiology but it could be done. However, the vertical
transmission model fitted it well.
- The added risk from BSE to a UK adult that continues to
eat beef products is now less than 5% of the risk that has
already been taken. Dealler S and Kent J. When the
difference in risk for people stopping eating beef at specific
dates is compared with the risk for those continuing it is seen
that there is little difference by the time we reach 1996. By
this time little difference is seen but only applies for people
that have eaten beef throughout the epidemic until that point.
It is also made clear that the apparent difference was quite
wide in 1989. The statistics only used the human diet as liver,
kidney, meat (and the nerves they contain).
- Scrapie in Iceland: epidemiology, main clinical and
pathological features and eradication program. Georgsson G
and Sigurdarson S. Institute for Experimental Pathology, Univ
of Iceland, Keldur, Reykjavik, Iceland. He explained that the
scrapie seemed to remain endemic in an area of the country even
if the sheep were removed. They then decided to cull all the
sheep in an endemic area farm, meticulously clean the and
disinfect the premises and restock 2 years later. Since this
has been introduced 200 farms that had been culled had not seen
another case of scrapie (more than 4 years later) but some farms
had seen some cases. The exact reason is unclear but a genetic
as well as environmental factor seems to be needed for the
development of disease. The final aim of total eradication of
the disease i the country by culling and restocking may prove to
be very difficult. Mr. Georggsson explained his worry about BSE
and that MAFF may be being hopeful that BSE disappears and does
not remain endemic.
- Detection of scrapie agent in theperipheral nervous
system of diseased sheep. Groschup MH, Weiland F and Pfaff
E. Federal Research Center for Virus Diseases of Animals, Paul
Erlich Str 28, 72072 Tubingen, Germany. Although no sensitivity
for the mouse assay was known, it was found that peripheral
nerves may contain >10 thousand IU per gram. The most important
factor here is that this represents one tenth of the amount
found in the brain (by Hadlow) in sheep. The question must
arise as to the absolute amount of infectivity that this
represent to be present in peripheral nerves (i.e. taking the
senstivity of the mouse assay into account) and from that the
amount of BSE infectivity present in the peripheral nerves of
cattle that are being eaten in the UK .
- Prion protein variation among primates, ungulates and
rodents. Schatzi HM et al. Max von Pettenkofer Institute,
University of Munich, Germany and University of California at
San Francisco Medical School USA. Using PCR it is now possible
to look at the primary structure of PrPc in many species at
once. What was found was that many aspects of the PrP were
retained throughout but some were variable. It was not, however
clear that the PrP structure could be used to indicate which
animals would be susceptible to the TSE derived from which other
ones.
- The generation of poly- and monoclonal antibodies to
prion proteins. Harmeyer S. Pfaff E and Groschup MH.
Federal Research Centre for Virus Diseases of Animals, Paul
Ehrlichman Str 28, 72072, Tubingen, Germany. They managed to
make antibodies against various sections of both the PrPc and
the PrPsc. The aim was to use the antibodies for diagnosis.
Other groups have found it very difficult to produce adequate
antibodies (except Proteus Co, UK) because the body generally
sees the proteins as being normal and so their work may be of
great use.
- Altered GABA distributio in hamster brainis an early
molecular consequence of infection by scrapie prions. Li G,
Lu P, Sturman JA, and Bolton DC. Dept of Molecular biology and
Developmental biochmistry, NY state office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disablities, INst for Basic Research in
Developmental Disabilities, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA. This
was an attempt to work out why the prion protein was needed in
the first place and why it was so well retained in animals.
They found that the GABA distribution changed very early in
infection.
- Perceived Food Risk: personal and general. Lennart Sjoberg,
centre for Risk Resarch, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.
A mailed survey about food risk. Complex in that many people
saw the risks of food in different ways (e.g. being overweight).
- A study of food risk perception and its relation to
purchasing behaviour. F. Bolger and AG Scliffe (City
University, UK), P. Ayton, Dept of Psychology, City University,
UK), P. Sparks, (Inst of Food Research, Reading, UK). This was
more a description of what was going to be carried out as a
study. A prediction is made that only a small number of factors
will be given by people as influencing their purchasing
behaviour and that a linear combination of weighted factors will
be a good predictor of information search in the shopping task.
- Trust and risk communication on food issues. R. Shepherd,
LJ Frewer and C. Howard. Institute of Food Research, Reading,
UK. Because there can be many apparent risks associated with
food (chemicals, bacteria, carcinogens, over-eating) it is
almost necessary now for the people eating to have believed what
the salesmen have told them i.e. that their the food is safe.
An attempt was made to analyse this trust.
- Risk analysis, risk assessment, animal health and
international trade. Marion wooldridge, Epidemiological Dept,
Centra Veterinary Lab, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey, KT15 3NB UK.
Various groups decided that concerning trade of meat, the zero
risk option was unworkable and hence a level of risk that should
be looked on as acceptable should be used. A scenario tree of
risk taking place throughout the production, transport,
distribution, and shopping could be made and the risk to various
groups assessed at each stage. The various international meat
trade agreements were described and how these would prevent
infected animals entering countries or not (e.g. the UK
demanding to be able to export infected cattle with BSE when the
EU prevented them).
- Microbiological risk assessment of meat: a veterinary
perspective. Katheryn Christiansen
Epidemiological Dept, Centra Veterinary Lab, New Haw,
Addlestone, Surrey, KT15 3NB UK. The paper examines the
usefulness of a risk assessment approach to evaluate the impact
of control measures at the farm and slaughterhouse on therisk to
public health from microbial hazards in meat. The one thing
that could not be brought in to this was the fact that an
'acceptable' risk level could not be decided. For instance,
with BSE any risk to humans at all could not be looked on as
acceptable to the consumer, whereas to the government a minor
risk would be acceptable and to macro-economists quite a large
risk level could be accepable as long as the population that
died were not wealth producers.
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
The North Yorkshire Society for the study of infection. Meeting
on the 5th of July 1996 at the Viking Hotel. in York
The hall was absolutely packed with people, many of whom were
from Public Health and the information given by the speakers was
very useful indeed. All the reports have been fully published
in the internet Journal of Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy except for that is below:
- Professor Anderson from Oxford University spoke
on the subject of the epidemiology of the disease. This was
after the withdrawal of John Wilesmith. He showed that the
disease had almost certainly been in the UK since the begining
of the 1980s and the number of cases had already started to rise
shortly afterwards (but were not seen by vets). He explained
that the cattle were not fed the infective material in large
amounts when neonates (they get either colostrum, or tallow-milk
initially) and only realtively small amounts of MBM in their
diet until milking cattle. This did not fit in with the idea
that they became infected when young unless they were more
easily infected. He explained that infection could be taking
place later than in early birth, he could not show that there
had been any change in incubation period or the age distribution
during the epidemic. He did not however touch on
under-reporting, changes in compensation, or many other factors.
One of the major things that didcome forward was that he felt
the rate of vertical transmission might be in the range of 8%
of the cattle seen and apparently had a method of working this
out from the epidemiology data derived directly from CVL. He
showed how the percentage might have risen to this level during
the period after the feed ban.
Royal Statistical Society
Royal Statistical Soc. 26.11.96 Special Meeting on BSE and
CJD
London
Synopses of speeches
John Wilesmith.
(Central Veterinary Lab, MAFF)
Observations on the epidemiology of BSE. BSE was first
recognised in November 1986 . Epidemiological studies suggest
that the first cases occurred around April 1985 and that the
most likely vehicle of a scrapie-like agent was meat and bone
meal, used as a protein supplement in cattle feedstuffs.
Subsequent case-control studies and the effects of the
legislative action, enacted in July 1988, prohibiting the
feeding of ruminant derived protein to ruminants have provided
strong supporting evidence that the feed borne source has been
responsible for the majority of cases of BSE. The occurrence of
cases of BSE in animals born after July 1988 has stimulated a
number o epidemiological studies. These have revealed that
there was incomplete compliance of the SBO ban, introduced for
animals in September 1990. This, together with various means of
cross contamination of cattle feedstuffs with meat and bone meal
or products containing this material were the main reason for
the continued exposure of the cattle population, albeit at a
very reduced rate. Interim analysis of a cohort study which was
initiated in July 1989 to examine the risk of maternal
transmission have recently been possible. The results of these
which, indicating a low risk of maternal transmission were
discussed (poorly - ed). However the main findings of the
studies is that the incidence of BSE is declining rapidly and
will be insignificant at the turn of the millennium even if no
further control measures are instigated. So far 28,541 cattle
born after the feed ban have been diagnosed with BSE. Age of
developing BSE did not vary with year of birth cohort. The
feeding of pigs with MBM stopped in September 1990.
Christl Donnelly.
(Zoology Dept, Univ of Oxford)
Epidemiological models of BSE: back calculation and
prediction. In the absence of in vivo test to detect
infection, back calculation methods using data on observed cases
of BSE allow the estimation of patterns of infection. Models
incorporating the exposure/susceptibility distribution, the
incubation period of distribution, feed risk, maternal
transmission and demography of British cattle. These were all
discussed but arguments remained as to the acceptability of
certain phenomena. For instance the apparent distribution over
the first year of life in which infection took place was not
thought to fit with biological data and the method used to
calculate this were thought to be inadequate currently. Also
some arguments were put forward concerning the large numbers of
degrees of freedom that were required by Dr. Donnelly's model.
She was asked by a member of the audience if beef and dairy
herds were similar. She said that when the age distribution of
the herds was taken into accoun that was found to be true.
Robert Curnow
(University of Reading). Is
susceptibility to BSE inherited? Genetic studies of BSE
have provided little evidence of inherited susceptibility. We
have attempted a more sensitive analysis incorporating the
likely exposure of each animal and the distribution of
incubation times. Random allocation of progeny to parents
analysis removes the apparent significance of genetic factors
when using a more classical approach. What came from this was
the indication that if vertical transmission did take place it
was probably not due to a transmission of a gene that permitted
infection and hence the VT findings of Wilesmith may well have
indicated infective transmission. Professor Curnow showed the
calculations that included his 5 herds and their well recorded
dams and sires. One of Curnow's main findings that surprised
the audience was that 30%-40% of the cattle in the herds
involved in his study would have been expected to die of BSE had
they lived long enough. This had been published earlier by Hau.
James Ironside
(Western General Hospital, Edinburgh CJD
Unit). The medical background to CJD. This was a short
over view of the appearance of the nvCJD over the past 2 years.
Interesting results he put forward:
4 CJD cases in dairy farm workers since 1990 (all herds BSE
positive)
2 CJD cases in beef suckler worker (one herd BSE positive)
Contact with meat and bone meal (p=0.003)
Contact with live BSE infected cattle (p=0.003)
This year there is an association between the eating of beef
(p=0.01) and brain (p=0.005) and getting CJD. But the p values
to up to 0.33 and 0.55 when compared with control groups.
PrP Genotype at position 129 of the population in the UK: MM
37%, MV 51%, VV 12%. In cases of sporadic CJD: MM 82%, MV 10%,
VV 8%. So far in nvCJD all are MM.
Simon Cousens
and Peter Smith (unable to attend)
(London School of Hygeine and Tropical Medicine).
Epidemiological surveillance of CJD in the UK. Past and
current methods were described. Results of some recent
epidemiological studies showed that it was impossible currently
to indicate the number of future cases of nvCJD that were to be
expected. It was described how methods to indicate such a risk
level would require a knowledge of the amount of infective
tissue (and its infectivity) to be known. This information was
being sought currently.
Graham Medley
(University of Warwick). Projections
of CJD cases: estimating the risk from BSE infection and
incubation period distribution. As was made clear by Dr.
Dealler in questions afterwards, although it was possible to put
forward attempts at calculation of such a risk, Dr. Medley felt
that this could not be done without further data. An attempt at
indicating what data would be needed and when such data would be
available merely through CJD surveillance showed that this would
take a long time (several years).
Sheila Gore
(MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge).
Safeguarding international public health: data, interpretation,
dissemination. The data relevant for estimation are
considered. International collaboration in the acquiring of
data, appropriate statistical methodologies for dealing with
uncertainty, rapid dissemination of peer-reiewed new results and
quarterly surveillance reports could ensure that public health
remains a top priority. Dr. Gore was adamant that quite
inadequate amounts of data were currently available although
they could have been so earlier e.g. the eating of brain tissue
from cattle in the UK. She also made it clear that estimates of
the prevalence of CJD in the population could be tested although
expensively and she gave indications of the number of people
that would need to be tested to get adequately accurate results.
Following the meeting there were lengthy discussion.
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